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WILL YoUTUBE SAIL INTO THE DMCA's SAFE HARBOR OR SINK FOR
INTERNET PIRACY?
MICHAEL DRISCOLL*

'A sorry agreement is better than a good suit in law."
English Proverb 1

INTRODUCTION

The year 2006 proved a banner year for YouTube, Inc. ("YouTube"), a wellknown Internet video sharing service, so much so that Time Magazine credited
YouTube for making "You" the Person of the Year. 2 Despite this seemingly positive
development for such a young company, the possibility of massive copyright
3
infringement litigation looms over YouTube's future.
For months, YouTube was walking a virtual tightrope by obtaining licensing
agreements with major copyright owners, yet increasingly gaining popularity
through its endless video selection, both legal and otherwise. 4 This successful
balancing culminated in October 2006 when Google purchased YouTube for $1.65
billion in Google stock. 5 Despite the sale, some analysts believed YouTube was still,
if not more, vulnerable to copyright infringement litigation following its acquisition
6
by Google.
The much-awaited suit finally came on March 13, 2007 when Viacom
International, Inc. ("Viacom") sued YouTube in federal court in the Southern District
of New York.7 This suit, however, was not the first infringement suit against

*

J.D. Candidate, May 2008, The John Marshall Law School. B.A. History, Creighton
University, May 2000. I would like to sincerely thank my editors Ryan Coward and Emily Adelman
and the entire staff of THE JOHN MARSHALL REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW for their

guidance and counsel during the many revisions of the Comment.
1 QUOTE IT COMPLETELY 963 (Eugene C. Gerhart ed. 1998).
2 Lev Grossman, Person of the Year: You, TIME, Dec. 25, 2006, at 41.

YouTube and other

websites were influential in 2006 because they gave people "an opportunity to build a new kind of
international understanding, not politician to politician, great man to great man, but citizen to
citizen, person to person." Id.
3 See Matthew Karnitschnig & Kevin J. Delaney, Media Titans Pressure YouTubo Over
Copyrights, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 2006, at A3 (noting that despite YouTube's numerous partnership
deals and compliance with the DMCA's "takedown" policy, YouTube is still vulnerable to copyright
liability on the issue of whether YouTube financially benefits from the presence of popular
copyrighted materials).
I See Chris Gaither & Dawn C. Chmielewski, Google Bets Big on Videos; The $1.65 Billion
Deal for Upstart YouTubo Allows the Search Giant to Expand in a Hot Soetor, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10,
2006, at Al.
, Daniel Henninger, What's YouTube?After $1.65 Billion, It's Time to Learn, WALL ST. J., Oct.
13, 2006, at A12.
GSee Karnitschnig, supra note 3.
7 Complaint, Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07-CV2103, 2007 WL 775611, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2007).
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YouTube. 8 Previously, an unlikely source, Robert Tur, an independent copyright
holder and reporter, had sued YouTube on July 14, 2006 for copyright violations of
his Los Angeles riots footage. 9
How will YouTube fare against these lawsuits? This Comment attempts to
answer this question. A cursory inspection reveals that YouTube's servers hold
infringing materials.10 Nevertheless, YouTube's modus operandi is unlike failed
examples of Internet innovations such as Napster or Grokster because it employs a
different distribution model, is less accessible to infringement, and YouTube itself is
more amiable to cooperation.1 1 In addition, unlike Napster and Grokster, the
advantages YouTube provides to copyright holders and the public far outweigh the
disadvantages.
This Comment begins by providing a general overview of the parties, relevant
legislation, and case law in Part I. Part II compares YouTube's model to past failed
services and discusses the advantages and disadvantages of YouTube's model. Part
III proposes that: 1) courts should use Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios as a starting point to deciding YouTube's liability; 2) Congress should amend
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to end ambiguity; and 3) YouTube and
copyright owners should further cooperate to form partnerships in order to avoid
prolonged litigation.

I. BACKGROUND
This section provides a general overview of the issues presented later in this
Comment. It begins with a brief description of YouTube and its business model.
s See Complaint, Tur v. YouTube, Inc., No. CV06-4436, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1627, at *1 (C.D.
Cal. July 14, 2006).
9 Heather Green, Whose Video is It Anyway?, YouTube's Runaway Success Has Opened a
Pandora'sBox of Copyright Issues, BUS. WK., Aug. 7, 2006, at 38 [hereinafter Green, Whose Video is
It Anyway.l. Green notes, "[q]uestions had been swirling for months about whether the upstart
[YouTube], which now dishes up 100 million daily videos, was crossing copyright boundaries by
letting members upload videos with little oversight. What was surprising was that it was an
individual who fired the first shot .. " Id.
10 Douglas Lichtman, The Case Against YouTube; Technology Has to Have Room to Grow, but
BadIntent by Web ProvidersMust Be Punished,L.A. TIMES, March 20, 2007, at 19.
" Does YouTubo Make Google a Big Target for Copyright Suits?, WALL ST. J. ONLINE,
available athttp://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB116049721244288215-dhXDre5B508j3fQQ2
eaVvj6sxg_20061109.html?mod= tff main tff top, (last visited April 3, 2007). This online article
features remarks from Harvard Law professor John Palfrey and University of Texas at Dallas
economics professor Stan Liebowitz. Id. Professor Palfrey writes, "YouTube is far different from
Napster or Grokster ....The thrust of the business is not to encourage anyone to violate copyright,
but rather to create works that they then can distribute online." Id. But see Tur, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1627, at *5-6. Tur states:
YouTube.com is not merely Grokster rodux. For unlike the peer-to-peer file
sharing systems at issue in the Grokster case, YouTube provides the computer
servers and "world-class data centers" which allow users to upload video clips
directly to YouTube's servers ....YouTube's business model allows it to have
actual knowledge of what particular copyrightable files are being distributed,
played and copied through its service.
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Next, it examines the specific copyright provisions of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act ("DMCA"). This section concludes with relevant copyright
infringement case law.

A. YouTube, Inc.
YouTube, a free video sharing website, ranks number one worldwide in video
and movie website visitors with twice the number of viewers as the next ranked
site. 12 To understand the magnitude of this accomplishment, consider that the
founders created the company in a garage on a maxed out credit card.13
Furthermore, YouTube did not become publicly available until late 2005.14 Since its
inception, its servers hold approximately 100 million videos with another sixty-five
thousand uploaded daily. 15 This represents a sixty percent market share of Internet
shared videos. 16 Thirty-eight million people visited YouTube in December 2006, and
17
its numbers continue to grow.
The reasons behind YouTube's tremendous popularity are probably due to
several factors. First, YouTube's site is completely free.18 Second, the site is easy to
use. 19 Third, its servers hold videos that are in high demand, including infringing
videos. 20 Estimates of YouTube's infringing content ranges from thirty to ninety
12 YouTube Goes Commercial, Sort of PC MAGAZINE, Aug. 22, 2006; see also Jessica Mintz,
Google s Tiny Tweak May Not Be So Minor; Home Page Replaces Link to Shopping Site Froogle to
Focus on Video, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Aug. 16, 2006, at D6. Compared to video sharing rivals,

YouTube is far ahead in regards to viewership. Mintz, supra. Mintz reports, "[i]n July [2006], about
30.5 million people visited YouTube, compared with 9.3 million to Google Video, and 5.3 million to
Yahoo, Inc.'s Yahoo Video ....
" Id.; see also David Greising & Eric Benderoff, Google, YouTube
Looking to Link?, Some Say Deal Makes Sense, Firms Silent, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 7, 2006, at C1. The
authors' graphic shows that, in September 2006, YouTube held a forty-six percent market share
while MySpace and Google held twenty-one percent and eleven percent, respectively. Greising,

supra.
"3Dave

Larson, From Trailers to TV Shows, from Virals to Viogs, You Tube Has It All, DAYTON

DAILY NEWS, Sept. 16, 2006, at D10. Larson reports:
YouTube was founded in February 2005 by Chad Hurley and Steve Chen,
who worked together at eBay's PayPal electronic-payment unit .... They maxed
out Chen's credit card on business expenses before securing a reported $3.5
million in financing in November 2005, when YouTube made its official debut.

Id.
Id.
1'Anthony S. Volpe, YouTube, Viral Videos and Copyright Infringement on the Internet,

14
5

LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 6, 2006.
16;Id.
17 The Rapid Rise of You Tube, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2007 (noting YouTube's increase in unique
visitors from 3.1 million in December 2005 to thirty-eight million in December 2006).
18 Larson, supra note 13.
'9 Steve Johnson, YouTube's Dream May Get Clipped, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 22, 2006, at C1 ("By
making it easy for people to upload their own videos and search and play others', the site has
unleashed demand that nobody else quite understood existed."); see also Megan H. Chan, NEWSDAY,
Aug. 17, 2006, at B6 ("YouTube's simple interface makes it easy for anyone ... to make a film and
upload for the watchings of the Web.").
20 See Sam Gustin, YouTube's Got a Fat Idea of Itself N.Y. POST, Sept. 21, 2006, at 40
(discussing that a "vast majority of content viewed on YouTube violates copyright law - 90 percent
by one estimate ....").

[6:550 2007]

Will YouTube Sail Into the DMCA's Safe Harbor?

percent of the content on its servers; however, the official number is highly
disputed. 21 For example, even Tur's complaint concedes that a "substantial" number
22
of YouTube users are not infringing.
YouTube receives revenue by offering various types of advertising space. 23 Thus,
24
the more visitors YouTube attracts, the more revenue received from advertisers.
Despite the large number of visitors, this business model has failed to generate
25
substantial revenue because of high operating costs.
Due to YouTube's coveted position in the video sharing world and its expected
profitable future and growth, Google purchased YouTube in October 2006 for $1.65
billion in stock. 26 On the same day, YouTube announced that it struck partnership
deals with media giants CBS, Universal Music Group, and Sony BM. 27 Previously,
YouTube achieved similar success when NBC and Warner Music Group announced
partnership agreements with YouTube. 28 In return for licensing their content, the
media giants receive a percentage of advertising revenue generated by their
29
copyrighted material.
YouTube's sale to Google and its partnerships with many media giants, the
potential litigants in future copyright cases, alleviated many infringement concerns,
at least for the time being.30 These successes can be credited to pressure from Google

21 See id. But see Laura M. Holson, Hollywood Asks YouTube: Friend or Foe?, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 15, 2007, at C1 (noting that "academics and media executives estimate [unauthorized content
on YouTube to be] anywhere from 30 percent to 70 percent.").
22 Complaint, Tur v. YouTube, Inc., No. CV064436, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1627, at *6-7 (C.D.
Cal. July 14, 2006) (stating that "substantial use of YouTube's website was and is made by users
uploading their own homemade videos ..
").
23 Gustin, supra note 20.
Gustin writes, "YouTube's stated business model is to 'pursue
advertising'...." Id.
24 Id.
25 Heather Green, YouTube: Waiting for the Payoff the Video-Sharing Web Site is a Runaway
Sueeess-Everywhero but on the Bottom Line, Bus. WK., Sept. 18, 2006, at 56 [hereinafter Green,
YouTube]. Green reports:
[YouTube's] business so far amounts to a whole lot of expenses, not much
revenue, and no profits. YouTube took on the job of creating the business model
for a new medium where anyone can post any video .... YouTube spends a tidy,
and growing, sum to stream its short clips. Current estimates range from
$900,000 to $1.5 million per month. Much of that goes for computer servers and
transmission bandwidth ....
its legal costs could balloon if lawsuits start piling
up.
Id.; see also Chan, supra note 19 (noting that YouTube's bandwidth expenses cost one million dollars
a month).
26 See Gaither, supra note 4.
27 See id.; see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND

THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 162 (Penguin Press) (2004)
[hereinafter LESSIG, FREE CULTURE] (noting that Universal, Warner, and Sony represent three of
the five major recording labels, which represent 84.8% of the U.S. recording market).
28 See Kevin J. Delaney & Ethan Smith, YouTubo Model is Compromise over Copyrights,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2006, at BI [hereinafter Delaney, YouTube Model].
29

Alex Veiga, YouTube May Benefit from Tech Upgrade; but Copyright Guard Could Hurt

Content, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 15, 2006, at C12.
30 See Gaither, supra note 4 ("The deals clear the way for music videos, television news, sports
clips and entertainment programs to be distributed free on YouTube in exchange for a share of
whatever advertising revenue may follow.").
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and YouTube investors to reduce possible infringement lawsuits by complying with
copyright law.31
Recently, however, some media giants, even those with partnership deals with
YouTube, have announced plans to start their own video sharing websites.3 2 NBC
Universal and News Corporation, both involved in a joint venture, claim that
advertising revenue is the motive for the new site.3 3 Nevertheless, some claim that
the proposed new site is directly related to media giant's displeasure with the
34
infringement on YouTube.

B. The Lawsuits
Of course, the most tell-tale sign of dissatisfaction is the presence of lawsuits.
To date, YouTube is the subject of two Internet copyright suits, both in their nascent
stages. The first suit was initiated by Robert Tur, a vigorous protector of his
copyrighted video. 35 Tur sued YouTube in the U.S. District Court for Central
California in July 2006.36 Tur alleges video copyright infringement of his L.A. riots
footage because of its availability on YouTube. 37 Tur's move was a surprise since
38
many of the major media giants were expected to strike first.
Viacom, the owner of MTV, Nickelodeon, and Comedy Central, did finally strike
on March 13, 2007 when it sued YouTube in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York.3 9 In total, Viacom is suing YouTube, and its owner Google, for
40
one billion dollars, nearly the amount that Google paid to purchase YouTube.

31 Id.
YouTube's recent partnerships were likely "a precondition of a deal with Google." Id.;
see also Gustin, supranote 20 (noting that YouTube's financial backer, Sequoia, pressured YouTube
to work toward legitimizing the website and changing the perception of copyright infringement and
illegality).
'2 See Richard Siklos, News Corp. andNBCin Web Deal,N.Y. TIMES, March 23, 2007, at C1.
'33 Id. (quoting Jeff Zucker, CEO of NBC Universal, "[w]hat [the new site] is doing is taking
advantage of the huge marketplace, both on the advertising side and consumer side, for this kind of
material.").
3' See id. ("News Corporation and NBC Universal ... have had complex and increasingly tense
relationships with Google, which owns YouTube. The media companies' copyrighted material ...
show up on YouTube without the media companies' permission.").
'3 Todd R. Brown, YouTube Hit with Lawsuit, SAN MATEO COUNTY TIMES, July 20, 2006 ('Tur
has been dogged in protecting his L.A. riots footage .... ").
36 Complaint, Tur v. YouTube, Inc., No. CV06-4436, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1627, at *1 (C.D.
Cal. July 14, 2006).
37 Id. at *10-11.
38 Green, Whose Video is It Anywy, supra note 9.
'39 Complaint, Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07-CV2103, 2007 WL 775611, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2007).
40 Miguel Helft & Geraldine Fabrikant, Viaeom Sues Google over Video Clips on Its Sharing
Web Site, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2007, at C1.
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C. The DigitalMillennium CopyrightAct
Congress's power to create copyright law is firmly established in Article I,
Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution. 41 The limited protection afforded authors is to
provide an incentive to create new works that will benefit the public. 42 In 1998,
43
Congress exercised this power when it amended the Copyright Act with the DMCA.
The DMCA sought to encourage the growth of the Internet by protecting Internet
service providers ("ISPs") from expensive litigation. 44
In effect, the DMCA is
designed as a balance between protecting the rights of copyright holders and
promoting Internet development. 45 This balance comes in the form of "safe harbor"
provisions that protect ISPs from monetary damages and limited injunctive relief if
the ISP's activities fall within certain statutory boundaries. 46 Although the statute
establishes the safe harbors, it also retains the traditional protections afforded
47
copyright holders for their protected works.
An ISP entity wishing safe harbor under the DMCA must fall into one of four
protected safe harbor categories: 48 conduit; 49 system caching; 50 system storage; 51 and

11U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8.
42

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).

1,3Raphael A. Gutierrez, Save the Slip fur the Service Providers:Courts Should Not Give Shurt

Shrift to the Safe Harbors of the DigitalMillennium Copyright Act, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 907, 907-08
(2002).(0 S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 8 (1998) [hereinafter Senate Judiciary Committee Report]. The
Report notes that the DMCA was "designed to facilitate the robust development and world-wide
expansion of electronic commerce, communications, research, development, and education in the
digital age." Id. at 1-2.
4 See id. at 8. The report on the DMCA suggests that Congress' failure to establish a balance
would cause a scenario where "copyright owners will hesitate to make their works readily available
on the Internet without reasonable assurance that they will be protected against massive piracy"
while "service providers may hesitate to make the necessary investment in the expansion of the
speed and capacity of the Internet." Id.
416So id.at 19. The DMCA enjoyed broad support from industry groups, technology
companies, as well as from individual copyright holders. Id. at 9. This support is evidenced by the
unanimous 18-0 committee vote approving the statute for a Senate floor vote. Id.
17 Id. at 19; see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (2006).
18 Gutierrez, supra note 43, at 909; see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(k).
The statute provides two
definitions of service providers. Id. at § 512(k)(1). The first category narrowly defines a service
provider as "an entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital
online communications, between or among points specified by a user, of material of the user's
choosing, without modification to the content of the material as sent or received." Id. at
§ 512(k)(1)(A). Under a more broad definition, a service provider is an entity that provides "online
services or network access." Id. at § 512(k)(1)(B).
49 Id. at § 512(a).
A service provider falls under the conduit safe harbor when its business
entails "transmitting, routing, or providing connections for... or by reason of the intermediate and
transient storage of that material in the course of such transmitting, routing or providing
connections ....
" Id.; see also Gutierrez, supra note 43, at 917-18 ("An entity attempting to claim
the protection of [the conduit] safe harbor must meet the narrow definition of service provider .. ").
5)0 17 U.S.C. § 512(b).
System caching is the "intermediate and temporary storage of material
on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider .. " Id.
IId. at § 512(c). System storage is the "storage at the direction of a user of material that

resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider .....Id.
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location tools. 5

2

The system storage

safe harbor, which is most

analogous to YouTube's structure and thus most appropriate for this Comment, will
be analyzed further.
The system storage safe harbor exempts a service provider from liability for the
"infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of
material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the
service provider.
...53 An entity must not violate any of the following to be
54
considered under the DMCA protection.
First, a storage service provider must lack "actual knowledge" of the
infringement.5 5 Even when the service provider lacks actual knowledge, the provider
must ensure that infringement was not "apparent."56 An apparent infringement is a
"red flag," exposing

the provider

to liability. 5 7

Whether

a red flag exists is

determined objectively although the subjective knowledge of the facts may be
relevant.5 8 When infringement is discovered, the provider must act "expeditiously to
59
remove, or disable access to, the material."
Second, for safe harbor protection, the ISP cannot receive a financial benefit as a
result of the infringement. 60 The legislative history recommends that "courts should
take a common-sense, fact-based approach, not formalistic one" when determining
61
whether a financial benefit resulted.
Third, a storage service provider, upon proper notice, must take measures to
remove and block infringing material for safe harbor protection. 62 The copyright
holder, when desiring removal of infringing material, must notify the provider's

52 Id. at § 512(d). An information tool service provider is involved in "referring or linking users
to an online location containing infringing material or infringing activity, by using information
location tools, including a directory, index, reference, pointer, or hypertext link .
Id.
,3 Id. at § 512(c)(1).
-Id.
5 Id. at § 512(c)(1)(A)(i).
6 [id. at § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
57 Gutierrez, supra note 43, at 926.
5S Senate Judiciary Committee Report, supranote 44, at 44. The report states:
[I]f the service provider becomes aware of a "red flag" from which infringing
activity is apparent, it will lose the limitation of liability if it takes no action. The
"red flag" test has both a subjective and an objective element. In determining
whether the service provider was aware of a "red flag," the subjective awareness
of the service provider of the facts or circumstances in question must be
determined.
However, in deciding whether those facts or circumstances
constitute a "red flag" - in other words, whether infringing activity would have
been apparent to a reasonable person operating under the same or similar
circumstances - an objective standard should be used.
Id.
F)917 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii).
60 Senate Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 44, at 44 ("In general, a service provider
conducting a legitimate business would not be considered to receive a 'financial benefit directly
attributable to the infringing activity' where the infringer makes the same kind of payment as noninfringing users of the provider's service.").
61Id.
62 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C).

[6:550 2007]

Will YouTube Sail Into the DMCA's Safe Harbor?

designated agent by written communication. 63 Nothing in the statute requires notice
from the copyright holder before initiating litigation.64 Similarly, a provider is not
required to remove infringing material even after receiving notice. 65
The
consequences for non-compliance are potentially very expensive as the provider loses
66
its safe harbor and is exposed to full infringement liability.

Finally, the DMCA also requires "[aiccommodation of technology" from the
service provider for safe harbor status. 67 Specifically, it requires the service provider
to implement a policy that removes repeat offenders. 68 In addition, it requires that
69
the provider "accommodates ... standard technical measures" to protect copyrights.
This is defined as a technical measure that is adopted by a "broad consensus of
copyright owners and service providers," is available on reasonable terms, and does
70
not impose "substantial costs on [the] service provider."
When a defendant does not fall under the definition of an ISP or within the
protection of a safe harbor, the owner of the copyright may sue for damages. 71 The
DMCA empowers courts to issue injunctions and award traditional damages
including actual damages, lost profits, and attorney fees.72 Where infringement was
committed willingly, the court may award statutory damages of $150,000 per
73
infringement.

D. Case Law Relating to CopyrightInfringement
Ambiguity exists as to how courts will deal with YouTube because some
provisions of the DMCA have not been tested in court.7 4 The following wellpublicized cases may shed light on the way courts will interpret Internet copyright
infringement in the case of YouTube under the DMCA.

63 Id. at

§ 512(c)(2). For the service provider to receive safe harbor, the company must appoint

a designated agent and publish the agent's name, address, phone number and electronic mail
address. Id.
61Senate Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 44, at 45 ("[C]opyright owners are not
obligated to give notification of claimed infringement in order to enforce their rights.").
65 Id. ("Section 512 does not require use of the notice and take-down procedure.").
66 Id.

6717 U.S.C. at § 512(i)(1).
6s Id. at § 512(i)(1)(A); see also Senate Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 44, at 52. The
legislative history suggests that this is an easy standard to meet because it does not require the
provider to "investigate possible infringements, monitor its services, or make difficult judgments as
to whether conduct is or is not infringing." Senate Judiciary Committee Report, supra. Instead, the
provider must simply implement a termination policy and remove those who "flagrantly abuse ...
intellectual property." Id.
6 Id. at § 512(i)(1)(B).
70Id. at § 512(i)(2)(A)-(C); Senate Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 44, at 52 (noting
that adopting the technical measures combating copyright infringement must be in a "open, fair,
voluntary, multi-industry standards process" similar to the manner used to protect DVDs against
infringement).
71See Senate Judiciary Committee Report, supranote 44, at 41.
7217 U.S.C. §§ 502-05.
73Id. at § 504(c)(2).
71Wendy N. Davis, Downloadinga File ofCopynight Woes, 93 A.B.A. J. 10, 10 (2007).
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In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, copyright owners sued the
manufacturer of Betamax video recording equipment under the theory of
contributory infringement.7 5 The copyright owners alleged that Sony was liable for
copyright infringement by Betamax consumers.7 6 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the District Court's finding and held that Sony was liable for contributory
infringement.7 7 The U.S. Supreme Court then reversed the Court of Appeals because
78
it found that Betamax equipment was capable of substantial non-infringing uses.
The fact that the plaintiffs could not establish that consumers recording television
programs caused any financial harm led the Court to find that Sony was not liable
79
for contributory infringement.
In A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., many groups within the recording
industry sued a popular website for Internet copyright infringement)80 The Ninth
Circuit found sufficient evidence of the notorious peer-to-peer ("P2P") file sharing
service's vicarious liability, among other theories, to continue the case at trial in the
District Court.81 Vicarious liability may be imposed when the defendant has the
right and ability to supervise an infringing activity, and receives a direct financial
benefit from the infringing activity.8 2 The court determined that Napster had the
ability to prevent infringing conduct or activities using available technology and that
Napster received more revenue based on the number of its users. 8 3 This combination
84
demonstrated sufficient evidence of vicarious liability.
In a more recent case, MGM
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., the U.S. Supreme
Court vacated and remanded a Ninth Circuit decision that held two P2P file sharing
providers, Grokster and StreamCast, liable for infringement of copyrighted material
by its users.8 5 The Court established an "inducement rule," which assigns liability to
service providers for the actions of third parties if the service provider promoted the
86
illegal use of the work.
The Court found three factors significant in its decision that Grokster and
StreamCast intentionally promoted copyright infringement.87 First, the Court noted
that the two companies intended to fill the void left in the wake of Napster's
downfall.88
Next, the Court stated that the defendants failed to mitigate the
presence of infringing materials through the development of filtering tools.8 9 Finally,
75Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 420 (1984).

Id.
Id. at 420.
78 Id. at 456.
79 Id.
80 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1010-11 (9th Cir. 2001).
81Id. at 1027.
82 Id. at 1022.
83 Id. at 1023, 1027.
81Id. at 1024.
S5MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 941 (2005).
76

77

86 Id.

at 936-37 ('[O]ne who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe

copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps to foster infringement, is liable for
the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.").
87 Id.

at 939.

88 Id.

("[E]ach company showed itself to be aiming to satisfy a known source of demand for

copyright infringement .. ").
89

Id. (noting that the lack of filtering tools "underscores Grokster's and StreamCast's

intentional facilitation of their users' infringement").
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the fact that Grokster and StreamCast received advertising revenue based on the
number of users who purchased and used the software was an important point for
the Court. 90 While no one single factor demonstrated intent to induce infringement,
the factors taken together showed an "unmistakable" unlawful objective. 91
The Grokster case has been criticized as an over-expansion of power by courts to
the detriment of Congress. 92 It is viewed as a reversal of a long-held policy of
93
deference to Congress on creating new forms of liability for copyright infringement.
The next section shows that applying Grokster to the cases against YouTube is not
appropriate given the numerous differences between the websites.

II. ANALYSIS
A close look at YouTube's business characteristics shows that YouTube is sui
generis-a thing of its own. 94 This fact is central to the question of YouTube's
liability. 95 This section explains why simply applying Grokster to YouTube is
inappropriate. Part A defines the YouTube model. Next, part B compares YouTube
with similar, but failed, Internet models. Finally, part C discusses the advantages
and disadvantages associated with YouTube.

A. What is the YouTuhe Model?
Three characteristics embody the YouTube model:
1) efforts toward
compliance with the DMCA; 96 2) partnerships with major media giants; 97 and 3)
large numbers of visitors with a potential for profitable relationships. 98 These
elements form the basis of the YouTube model discussed throughout this Comment.

90Id.at 939-40.
91Id. at 940.
92 Lawrence

Lessig, Make Way for Copyright Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, March 18, 2007 [hereinafter

Lessig, Copyright Chaos].
93 Id.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1434 (6th ed. 1990).
9 Does You Tubo Make Google a Big Target for Copyright Suits?, supra note 11 ("The business
94

model that YouTube features is a far cry from any of the early music file-sharing businesses. That
difference in business model should make a big difference in terms of the copyright risk calculus.").
96 Id.

YouTube has been a model citizen.., they've gone out of their way to license
content from big content owners, they've been working on fingerprinting solutions
to help content owners track their copyrighted materials, and they've sought to
make it easy ... for submitting a complaint about copyright violations.
Id.
97
98

See Gaither, supra note 4.
See YouTube Goes Commercial,Sort of supra note 12.
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B. Comparison with Past Models
Analysis of past Internet infringing sites shows that YouTube is fundamentally
different.9 9 This fact differentiates YouTube with regard to the possibility of liability
for copyright infringement based on past cases. 100 The following section compares
YouTube with Napster and Grokster, both failed models and past Internet infringing
sites.

1. YouTube Works to Remove InfringingMaterial
Napster and Grokster, prior to their respective demises, skirted copyright law. 10 1
For Napster, it is estimated that eighty-seven percent of its content was without
copyright permission.102 Similarly, it is estimated that ninety percent of Grokster's
103
content infringed copyright.
On the other hand, YouTube's focus on partnership and licensing deals suggests
its desire to work with copyright owners. 10 4 YouTube founder Chad Hurley defends
YouTube's position, "[w]e're not the next Napster because we're not renegades trying
to fight the system .... We're working aggressively with the content community to
remove it."105
YouTube's conduct suggests that it likely falls within the DMCA. Courts are
likely to classify YouTube as a system storage service provider because its users
upload videos onto YouTube servers.10 6 As a storage provider, YouTube may be liable
for infringement if it has knowledge of infringement or the infringement was
apparent under § 512(c)(1)(A).107 YouTube's conduct suggests that it meets this
requirement because it removes infringing videos when notified.108
Further, YouTube posts warnings against infringement to users who upload
videos in accordance with § 512(i).109 YouTube indisputably holds copyrighted
99See Does YouTube Make Google a Big Target for Copyright Suits?, supra note 11 ("Google
should be able to avail itself of the DMCA's broad safe harbor for copyright infringement under U.S.
law.").

'oo Id.
101 See William Sloan Coats et al, Pre- and Post-GroksterCopyrightInfringement Liabilityfor
Secondary and Tertiary Parties,at 323, 338 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop.
Course, Handbook Ser. No. 8821, 2006), available atWL, 877 PLI/Pat 323.
102 A&M Records, Inc. V. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 903 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
10:3Coats, supra note 101, at 338.
101Does YouTube Make Google a Big Target for Copyright Suits?, supranote 11.
105 Dawn C. Chmielewski, Studios Not Sure If You Tube Site is Friendor Foe, CHI. TRIB., Apr.

16, 2006, at C10.
106 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B). Under the broad definition of a service provider, YouTube
provides "online services or network access ....
" Id.
107See Gutierrez, supranote 55, at 926.
10 See, e.g., Noam Cohen, YouTube is PurgingCopyrighted Clips, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2006, at
C8 (discussing YouTube's removal of unauthorized Comedy Central videos clips following a request

by Comedy Central); YouTube Deletes 30,000 Files After a Copyright Complaint, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
21, 2006, at C4 (noting that YouTube "quickly complied with the request to remove the copyright
materials" by a group of Japanese entertainment companies).
109 See YouTube Community Guidelines, http://youtube.com/t/community-guidelines
(last
visted April 5, 2007). YouTube's site warns users, "[r]espect copyright. Only upload videos that you
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material without the owner's permission, although the actual number is unknown. 110
Nevertheless, some owners are either aware of their material on YouTube or actually
uploaded it themselves and see the benefits of the material's use on YouTube. 11 1
In addition, YouTube is developing "fingerprinting" software that compares
11 2
known copyrighted works in a database with the video being uploaded by a user.
Although the details are scarce, the software may allow the media companies to
directly choose whether to accept or reject a video. 11 3 This is potentially much faster
than the current takedown procedures under the DMCA. 114 While YouTube is
working to curtail infringement through this software, it will only be available to
major media groups and not independent copyright holders, like Robert Tur, until an
11 5
undetermined future date.
Recently, delays in launching this software have endangered YouTube's current
licensing agreements. 116 Viacom, prior to the suit, officially requested the removal of
100,000 videos on YouTube after the video provider failed to deliver the filtering
118
software on time.1 17 YouTube complied with the removal request before the suit.
The fact that this software is in development suggests that it is not a "standard
technical measure" required under § 512(i) and thus supports YouTube's position.11 9
In addition, the fact that the software is a unilateral effort by YouTube, and not a
multi-industry standard, supports the notion that YouTube is under no duty to
implement it and is thus within the safe harbor. 120

2. You Tube is TechnologicallyDistinguishablefrom Napsterand Grokster

Both Napster and Grokster did not actually hold files on their servers, although
both sites differed on their setups.1 21 Instead, the now defunct companies used a P2P
made or that you have obtained the rights to use. This means don't upload videos you didn't make,
or use content in your videos that someone else owns the copyright to ...without their permission."
Id.
110
See Holson, supra note 21.
111Soo, e.g., Evgeny Morozov, Bornt Also Tricked Web,NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, Nov. 19, 2006,
at 1 (discussing the use of YouTube by 20th Century Fox to promote the film "Borat").
112 Veiga, supra note 29.
11:

''

Id.

See Delaney, YouTube Model supra note 28 (reporting that under YouTube's proposed

system, "media companies will have a way to have their content removed without resorting to

separately sending takedown letters ....
").
115 See id. ("YouTube in the future will explore options for sharing online ad revenue with
smaller, or amateur creators, Mr. Hurley said. But 'right now we're building tools for record labels,

TV networks and movie studios."').
116 See Geraldine Fabrikant and Saul Hansell, Viacom Tolls YouTubo: Hands off N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 3, 2007, at C1 (reporting that YouTube's inability to filter unauthorized content caused Viacom
to request the removal of 100,000 videos).
117
Viacom Wants Its Clips Removed from YouTubo, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 3, 2007, at 1.
118 Id.
119 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B).
120 Id. at § 512(i)(2)(A).
121 See Coats, supra note 101, at 334, 338. Regarding Napster, "music files were downloaded
directly from other Napster users and never passed through Napster's servers." Id. at 334.
Grokster had "no indices of infringing files [were] maintained on the servers ....
" Id. at 338.
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setup, which linked users to each other's computers. 122 In contrast, YouTube uses a
vastly different technology structure. 123 When a user uploads a video for public
124
viewing, the file is located on YouTube's servers.
In addition, Napster and Grokster, using file-sharing P2P software, allowed the
transfer of files from one computer to another. 125 These services did not put
restraints on the type or size of the file. 126 Thus, full length movies could easily be
transferred.127 Once the user downloaded the file, the file was forever out of the
control of the copyright holder whether or not it consented to the initial transfer of
the file. 128 Copyright holders could not benefit from any direct advertising because
the user was not required to return to the site to play the file. 129 Instead, the user
could use the file indiscriminately through an MP3 player during any activity
without viewing advertisements. 130 In addition, the damage of the shared file could
not be mitigated because the user could distribute it freely.131
In contrast, YouTube's videos are available only on its website. 132 Videos are not
downloadable or transferable to other computers or peripheral devices. 133 YouTube
prohibits viewing full length movies on its site. 134 Specifically, it limits uploaded
videos to ten minutes in length, although, some users have uploaded full movies into
nine minute increments. 135 The user must watch the video clip on YouTube's site, in
front of YouTube's banner advertising. 136 Thus, the copyright holder, if it consents,
may benefit from advertising revenue. 137 Furthermore, the damage of an infringing
122Id. at 337-38.

See YouTube Help Center, http://www.google.com/support/youtube/bin/answer.py?answer=
55749&topic=10509 (last visited April 6, 2007) ("YouTube is an online video streaming service that
allows anyone to view and share videos that have been uploaded by our members.").
123

124

See id.

See Coats, supra note 101, at 334, 338.
See Daniel B. Wood, The YouTube World Opens an Untamed Frontierfor Copyright Law,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 18, 2006, at 1 (quoting David Axtell, an intellectual property
attorney, "[d]uring Napster's heyday, people were making their own digital copies and using them
on their own.").
127 See id.
128 Soo id.
125
126

129

See id.

See id.
131See id.
1,32See YouTube Help Center, http://www.google.com/support/youtube/bin/answer.py?answer=

130

56100&topic=10517 (last visited April 5, 2007) ([C]urrently you can't download our videos to your
computer. YouTube's video player is designed to be used within your browser as an Internet
experience.").
133 See Wood, supra note 126 (quoting David Axtell, "The very big difference between today's
YouTube and the music-sharing of MP3 files several years ago is that you have to watch and you
can't - absent the knowledge of advanced hackers - copy it for your own use.").
134 YouTube Help Center, http://www.google.com/support/youtube/bin/answer.py?answer=
55743&topic=10527 (last visited April 6, 2007) (stating "there is a 10-minute length limit for all
videos" on YouTube).
135 Id.; Holson, supra note 21 (reporting that some YouTube users circumvent YouTube's
safeguards by slicing a movie into nine minute segments and uploading each segment onto
YouTube).
136See YouTube Help Center, http://www.google.com/support/youtube/bin/answer.py?answer=
56100&topic=10517 (last visited April 6, 2007).
137Gaither, supra note 4.
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video is mitigated because the file cannot be transferred to other computers through
38
YouTube. 1
Asserting that YouTube is responsible for an individual user's actions is a
somewhat attenuated claim when one considers that YouTube has 100 million videos
on its servers with an additional sixty-five thousand uploaded daily.1 3 9 These
numbers provide a glimpse of the manpower required to sift through the videos to
find materials suspected of infringement. To make matters more difficult, in the case
of independent or small content owners, how would YouTube know whether the video
had obtained permission to be distributed before being uploaded? YouTube also
claims that it is against approving clips because it would have a negative effect on
140
the spontaneity and community feel of YouTube.

C. Advantages of the YouTube Model
YouTube's presence provides benefits to copyright holders and the public.
Arguably, these facts should be considered by courts when considering YouTube's
liability. The following section discusses these policy arguments.

1. The CopyrightHolders May Save Money and Increase Revenue
Avoiding litigation may save copyright holders substantial amounts of money
intended for potentially fruitless lawsuits. 14 1 Past efforts by the recording industry
to curtail Internet infringement, through litigation, have reaped no significant social
or private benefits. 142
While Napster and Grokster subsequently stopped
infringement, the vacuum left by these popular sites simply spawned other infringing
sites. 143 The progeny of these infringing sites, in turn, created systems that differed
slightly from the infringing sites in order to fall outside the application of past
cases. 144 Still worse, in the case of Napster, it was unable to compensate the
recording industry for its past infringement. 145
In addition, copyright holders may save money by uploading programs on
YouTube and thereby avoiding costly advertising. 146 Recently, 20th Century Fox
used YouTube for free advertising to increase publicity for the much-awaited movie,

138 See YouTube Help Center, http://www.google.com/support/youtube/bin/answer.py?answer=
56100&topic=10517 (last visited April 6, 2007).
139 See Volpe, supra note 15.
110
John Cloud, The YouTubo Gurus, TIME, Dec. 25, 2006, at 74.
"I So Coats, supra note 101, at 327 (noting that litigation by major media groups against
these infringing Internet networks "have not been extremely successful to this point").
12 See id.
14: Id.

144 See id. at 337 ("Following the Napster decision, a number of new peer-to-peer file-sharing
services have appeared. These new services employ slightly different technology than Napster, with
the major distinguishing factor being that the new services do not maintain a central index of
available files on their own servers.").
15 Id. at 327.
116 See, e.g., Morozov, supranote 111.
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Borat.147 This media campaign on YouTube is credited with the movie's success at
the box office. 148 The following section discusses the direct and indirect benefits of
YouTube's model.

a. Direct Benefits to CopyrightHolders
YouTube may increase revenue for copyright holders if the copyright holders
form an agreement with YouTube. Under proposed schemes, a copyright holder may
receive a portion of advertisement revenue for YouTube's use of the copyrighted
material. 149 This prospect has been a significant draw to the major media companies,
150
Viacom excluded.
Moreover, YouTube may provide a benefit by reaching demographic groups that
prove difficult to interest through traditional advertising and programming. 15 1 This
fact explains Warner's decision to work with YouTube.1 52 Warner's executive, Alex
Zubulliga, described the reasoning, "[YouTube] is a phenomenon which kids have
embraced which is only going to continue to grow .... We're much better innovating

and embracing this than trying to stop it."' 153

b. The YouTube Effect: Indirect Benefits to CopyrightHolders
Copyright holders may also profit indirectly from exposure on YouTube through
the YouTube Effect, the incidental benefit that owners receive for material on
YouTube with or without permission.1 54 NBC is a beneficiary of this phenomenon
155
and an apt example of the YouTube Effect's evolution and acceptance.
In early 2006, the Saturday Night Live skit "Lazy Sunday" was uploaded onto
YouTube without NBC's permission.1 56 The video created a major buzz on YouTube
when it received six million views before NBC requested its removal. 157 This
147

Id.

4 [Id.

19 Gaither, supra note 4 (discussing YouTube's deals with Universal Music Group, Song BMG,
and CBS in sharing advertising revenue generated by the copyrighted materials).
15M See id.; see Helft, supra note 40.
] l See Sara Kehaulani Goo, Google Gambles on Web Video, Firm to Pay $1.65 Billion for
Popular, Unprofitable YouTube, Oct. 10, 2006, at AO1.
152 See Kevin J. Delaney & Ethan Smith, YouTube, Warner Music to Share Revenue in
AdvertisingAgreement, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2006, at A12 [hereinafter Delaney, YouTube, Warner
to Share Revenue].

Id.

F:)3

IF See Moises Naim, The You Tube Effect, How a Technology for Teenagers Became a Force for
Politicaland Economic Change, FOREIGN POL'Y, Jan. 1, 2007, at 104. Naim, the editor in chief of
FOREIGN POLICY, defines the YouTube Effect as "the phenomenon whereby video clips, often
produced by individuals acting on their own, are rapidly disseminated throughout the world thanks
to video-sharing Web sites such as YouTube, Google Video, and others." Id.
155

Chan, supranote 19.

Id. Chan reports, "the sketch and the free viral marketing that followed was largely
credited with stimulating interest back into the late-night broadcast. Still, NBC forced YouTube to
yank the clip from its site, citing copyright infringement." Id.
IF7
Gaither, supra note 4.
'56
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phenomenon is credited with reviving interest in the struggling late-night TV
institution. 15S Despite the increase in ratings, NBC requested the removal of the clip
159
from YouTube.
NBC received another boost from YouTube when its failed show, Nobody's
Watching, received 400,000 views on YouTube. 160 In response, NBC decided to re-air
the show. 161 These events convinced NBC to reverse its policy from requesting
removal to partnering actively with YouTube in promoting its TV shows. 162 Even
more fascinating, Saturday Night Live, in December 2006, uploaded an uncensored
version of "Special Treat in a Box," a skit that featured a word banned on network
164
television. 163 In just one week, the clip received two million viewers on YouTube.
1 65
Since then, the clip has been viewed over nineteen million times.
CBS, too, has benefited greatly from its partnership with YouTube, but its
general view of YouTube is different than NBC's. a66 In addition to thirty million
viewers of CBS clips on YouTube, CBS's television programming has increased
viewership as a result of the additional YouTube exposure.1 67 With NBC's and CBS's
success on YouTube, it is likely that other copyright owners will recognize the
potential YouTube Effect.1 68 However, it has been suggested that the content owners
will only tolerate their copyright on YouTube provided they set the rules. 169 This
appears to be the case with the Viacom suit and the possible creation of a YouTube
rival engineered by media giants.

1,8 Chan, supranote 19.
') Id.

160 Volpe, supra note 15 ("The television series Nobody's Watching was discarded after airing
just the pilot. However, the show found new life on YouTube. After over 400,000 people downloaded
the video that generated numerous positive reviews, NBC decided to put the series back into
development.").
16 Id.
162 Id.
163 Jacques Steinberg, Censored 'SNL' Sketch Jumps Bleepless Onto the Internet, N.Y. TIMES,

Dec. 21, 2006.
I6>Id.
165 YouTube Most Viewed Videos, http://youtube.com/browse?s=mp&t=a&c=0&l= (last visited

April 6, 2007).

16N Chris Taylor, Google's Copyright Fix, BUSINESS MAGAZINE 2.0, Dec. 11, 2006, available at
http ://money.cnn.com/2006/12/08/magazines/business2/youtube-piracy.biz2/?postversion=200612081
8. Taylor notes that the relationship between CBS and YouTube has increased CBS's television
ratings. Id. As a result, '[i]t won't take long for other networks to embrace YouTube." Id.

167

Id.

168

See id.; see Volpe, supra note 15 ("For all of the potential copyright issues, the content

owners, like television and cable networks and the recording industry, have recognized the potential
for a mutually beneficial partnership on the Internet.").
169 Vanessa Juarez, YouTube Nation, ENT. WKLY., Aug. 25, 2006, at 7 ("The networks will work
with YouTube, as long as they decide what tramps around for free.").
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2. Benefits to Society
Society may benefit because YouTube provides an alternate forum compared to
traditional methods of educating and influencing the public. 170 Recently, unlikely
sources such as the federal government and political candidates have recognized the
value of YouTube by posting videos. 171 Unlike expensive television commercials,
YouTube provides a free venue for the government and politicians to air their
messages to audiences traditionally difficult to reach.172
In addition, YouTube's presence may encourage innovation. 173 With YouTube,
creative people are able to find an audience while avoiding the necessity of being
promoted by a major media giant. 174 One observer calls this phenomenon the
"democratization of pop culture." 175 Now people have an outlet "to tell the story of
176
our generation and to shape the landscape of the civil space."
D. Disadvantages
Accepting the YouTube model is not without disadvantages, some of them
significant. The main problems of YouTube's business model vis-a-vis copyright
infringement are that it focuses on partnerships with large media groups and
accepting such a model increases the possibility of unintentionally reducing copyright
protections.
First, YouTube focuses on preventing infringement of the major media
177
companies' copyrighted materials as opposed to copyrights held by individuals.
Currently, YouTube is devoting much energy toward appeasing these media giants
through potentially lucrative advertising revenue. 178 The fingerprinting software
that will be available only to media giants is an example of YouTube's myopic views
disfavoring independent copyright owners. 179 In addition, smaller copyright holders
receive no revenue even if YouTube receives substantial money for the number of
views.180
Further still, they must go through the bureaucratic DMCA removal
181
process while their material is infringed.
170 See Judy Keen, Websites Win Candidates' Praise, Young People Pushed Them to Get
Online, USA TODAY, Oct. 17, 2006, at 3A (noting the recent phenomenon of politicians embracing
sites frequented by younger generations to spread their message).
171 Id.; US Takes War on Drugs to YouTubo, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 20, 2006, at 3. (noting that the
White House recently posted its anti-drug videos on the site to broaden its exposure to younger
audiences that were difficult to reach through conventional means of communication).
172 See Keen, supra note 170; see US Takes War on Drugs to YouTubo, supra note 171.
173 See About YouTube, http://youtube.com/t/about (last visited April 3, 2007).
YouTube's
website states this goal explicitly, "[a]s more people capture special moments on video, YouTube is
empowering them to become the broadcasters of tomorrow." Id.
174 See Patrick Goldstein, The People's Republic of YouTube, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2006, at 1.
175 Id.

176 Does YouTube Make Google a Big Target for Copyright Suits supra note 11 (statement by
Prof. Palfrey).
177 Delaney, You Tubo Model, supra note 28.
178 Id.

See id
See id.
181 See id.

179

180
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Second, YouTube's existence may water down copyright protections.1 8 2 The
copyright system was designed to offer incentives and rewards to artists who produce
original works.18 3 By receiving advertising revenue and not sharing it with copyright
owners, YouTube may receive a financial benefit from the works of others and
18 4
decrease a person's incentive to produce works in the future.
On the other hand, a copyright owner's overaggressive protection of copyright,
called copyright misuse,18 5 may have a chilling effect on innovation. 18 6 Stanford Law
Professor Larry Lessig argues that this misuse has created a "permission culture"
that stifles both artistic and technological creativity.18 7 Similarly, author David
Bollier notes, "the overexpansion of copyright laws can wreak havoc on all sorts of
important values in American life."188 The continuing lawsuits against other
innovators from media giants have discouraged individuals from pursuing creative
endeavors on the Internet where the law is unclear. 189
As discussed in this section, YouTube is not a perfect solution to copyright
infringement. Nevertheless, YouTube is sufficiently different from past cases of
massive Internet infringement and its inherent benefits demonstrate the need for a
new standard. The next section proposes three courses of action to provide a balance
between the needs of copyright owners with the need to continue Internet innovation.

III. PROPOSAL
This section proposes three courses of action to deal with the new legal issues
that have developed in the wake of YouTube and sites like it. First, courts should
adopt a different approach when adjudicating claims against YouTube and sites that
adopt YouTube's model. YouTube is neither Napster nor Grokster redux. Asserting
a Groksterlike case, founded on inducement, will not be easy because YouTube
continually removes content in compliance with the DMCA.190 It is important that
both copyright owners and courts recognize that the YouTube model is distinct from
past Internet models because its ability to harm copyright owners is significantly
reduced.

182

See Does YouTube Make Google a Big Target for Copyright Suits?, supra note 11 (statement

by Prof. Liebowitz) ("[YouTube] shouldn't be allowed to usurp the rights of the copyright owners who
have not voluntarily agreed to provide such rights, not when someone is making big bucks from the
properties.").
183 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
181 See Does YouTube Make Google a Big Target for Copyright Suits?2 supra note 11 (statement
by Prof. Liebowitz).
185 See Victoria Smith Ekstrand, Protecting the Public Policy Rationale of Copyright:
Reconsidering Copyright Misuse, 11 COMM. L. & POL'Y 565, 565 (2006). Copyright misuse occurs
'when the plaintiff has claimed a right in his work beyond the scope of copyright law and when such
a claim is contrary to public policy." Id. A defendant accused of copyright infringement may claim
copyright misuse as an affirmative defense. -d. at 568.
18c, See LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 27, at 185.
187 See id. at 192.
188 DAVID BOLLIER, BRAND NAME BULLIES: THE QUEST TO OWN AND CONTROL CULTURE 194
(John Wiley & Sons) (2005).
189 See LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 27, at 193.

190 Does You Tube Make Google a Big Target for Copyright Suits2 supranote 11.
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The best test for courts to apply in such cases is Sony. Under this test, a device
that has substantial non-infringing uses does not subject its creator to copyright
infringement.191 Whether YouTube's inventory is substantially non-infringing is a
question for the courts. The YouTube Effect and other benefits of YouTube call into
question whether YouTube is harming Viacom or Tur. As discussed earlier, exposure
via YouTube may lead to more viewers and increase interest. The benefits to society
further bolster YouTube's position.
Second, Congress's amendment of the DMCA is needed to end the confusion.
When the DMCA was passed, Congress did not contemplate video sharing sites like
YouTube. 192 As a result of this ambiguity, lawsuits against YouTube and similar
sites will continue to proliferate. In response to the sites, courts have asserted their
role in determining the intent of Congress. 193 Without a change by Congress, the
confusion and the ensuing lawsuits may hinder the development of the Internet. 194
Third, media giants should adapt to the changing world of YouTube. If history
is any indicator, future litigation against suspected copyright infringers will be very
expensive. 195 To this day, many sites still skirt the law despite continued litigation
against P2P companies. 196 Instead of stopping P2P infringement, litigation simply
encouraged new sites to offer the same illegal content as Napster and Grokster after
their respective demise. 197 Even after the protracted legal battles, there exists the
risk that the infringer may not be able to compensate for the past infringement.
Nevertheless, YouTube should still cooperate with copyright owners to provide
them with proper compensation even if it attains safe harbor status. Further,
YouTube should redouble its effort to provide fingerprinting software to prevent
infringing videos from continually appearing on YouTube. Continuing without the
software only creates the appearance of illegality, an attribute that may hurt
198
YouTube.

V. CONCLUSION
Gone are the Wild West days of the Internet, when companies like Napster and
Grokster skirted the law. Today, the Internet has evolved significantly. Emerging
companies like YouTube have sought to work within the confines of the DMCA. At
the same time, YouTube continues to work with media giants to create mutually
beneficial relationships. Further, YouTube is unique in that it provides benefits to
copyright holders and society at large. These attributes are unique to YouTube and

191 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984).
192 Davis, supra note 74, at 11.
193 See Lessig, Copyright Chaos, supra note 92.
194 See id. ("The Internet will now face years of uncertainty before this fundamental question
about the meaning of a decade-old legislative deal gets resolved.").
195 See Coats, supra note 101, at 327 (noting that litigation against these companies has been
both expensive and ineffective because new infringing sites simply replaced the old infringing sites
once they no longer permitted copyright infringement).
196 Correy E. Stephenson, As Technology Continues to Advance, Tech-Rolatod Lawsuits
Continue to Proliferate,LAWYERS WKLY USA, March 27, 2006.
197 Id.
198

Davis, supra note 74, at 11.
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support its legitimacy. In the end, if copyright owners fail to recognize the place of
YouTube, they run the risk that courts might.

